US South Dakota Salesperson License Exam Set Two

An easement in gross grants a right to use another’s land (the servient estate) to a specific person or entity, rather than benefiting another parcel of land (a dominant estate). A critical distinction exists between a personal easement in gross and a commercial easement in gross. A personal easement in gross, such as a right granted to an individual to hunt on a property, is a personal right that is not transferable and typically terminates upon the death of the easement holder. In contrast, a commercial easement in gross is one that serves a business, commercial, or economic purpose, such as for utilities, railroads, or pipelines. Under South Dakota law and prevailing common law principles, commercial easements in gross are treated as business assets. They are freely alienable, meaning they can be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred from one entity to another. The death of the grantor of the servient estate does not terminate a validly created and recorded easement, as the easement is an encumbrance that runs with the servient land and binds subsequent owners. In the given scenario, the easement for utility lines is a commercial easement in gross. Therefore, it did not terminate upon the original grantor’s death and was legally assignable to the new utility corporation as part of a sale of assets. The new owner of the servient estate is bound by the terms of the existing easement.

The core legal principle at issue is the requirement of valid delivery for a deed to effectuate a transfer of title. In South Dakota, for voluntary alienation of real property by deed to be complete, the grantor must deliver the deed to the grantee during the grantor’s lifetime. This delivery must be absolute and unconditional, signifying the grantor’s intent to part with control of the instrument and immediately transfer title. In this scenario, Arlo executed a deed but placed it in his personal safe deposit box with instructions for it to be given to the grantee after his death. By retaining the deed in a location under his exclusive control, Arlo did not relinquish dominion over it. This action demonstrates an intent to transfer title in the future, upon his death, rather than a present intent to convey. This constitutes an attempted testamentary transfer, which is a disposition intended to take effect at death. Such transfers are only valid if they comply with the strict legal formalities required for a will. Since the deed was not delivered during Arlo’s life, the conveyance failed. Consequently, the property was never legally transferred to the historical society and remains an asset of Arlo’s estate, to be distributed according to his will or the laws of intestate succession. The grantee’s awareness and acceptance are immaterial without a preceding valid delivery.

This question does not require mathematical calculation. In South Dakota, real estate law provides for a specific structure called appointed agency to handle in-house transactions where one licensee in a firm represents the seller and another licensee in the same firm represents the buyer. When a responsible broker designates one agent for the seller and another for the buyer, those individual agents, the appointees, function as exclusive agents for their respective clients. They owe full fiduciary duties, such as loyalty, obedience, and confidentiality, to the party they represent. However, the responsible broker’s role fundamentally changes. The broker, who oversees both appointed agents, is legally converted into a disclosed limited agent for both the seller and the buyer. This status must be disclosed in writing and agreed to by both clients. As a limited agent, the broker’s primary obligation is to supervise the appointees and to maintain the confidentiality of any sensitive information received from either party. The broker cannot advocate for one side over the other and must remain neutral, ensuring that confidential pricing strategies, motivations, or other private details are not shared between the parties via the brokerage’s central management. This structure allows the firm to facilitate the transaction while managing the inherent conflict of interest that would arise in a traditional dual agency scenario.

No calculation is required for this question. Under South Dakota Codified Law, Chapter 44-9, a property owner can file a Notice of Project Commencement with the register of deeds before visible work begins. The primary purpose of this notice is to protect the owner and subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers from hidden liens. Once this notice is properly filed, the rules for perfecting a mechanic’s lien change significantly for any subcontractor or supplier who does not have a direct contract with the property owner. Specifically, SDCL 44-9-15 requires that any such subcontractor or supplier must provide a written Notice of Furnishing Labor or Materials to the property owner and the general contractor. This notice must be served within sixty days after the subcontractor or supplier first furnishes labor or materials for the project. Failure to provide this timely notice is fatal to the lien claim. The lien becomes unenforceable. In the described scenario, the property owner, Alistair, correctly filed a Notice of Project Commencement. Both Dakota Timber and Maria were subcontractors who did not have a direct contract with Alistair. Dakota Timber began supplying materials on April 5th, so they had until approximately June 4th to serve their Notice of Furnishing. Maria began work on April 20th, giving her until approximately June 19th to serve her notice. Since the scenario indicates that neither party provided this required preliminary notice to Alistair, their subsequent attempts to file mechanic’s liens are invalid and unenforceable against his property, even if the lien statements themselves were filed within the statutory 120-day period after their last contribution.

South Dakota operates under the legal doctrine of prior appropriation for governing the use of surface water. This principle is often summarized as “first in time, first in right.” It means that the right to use water is not tied to the ownership of land adjacent to a water source, which is the basis of the riparian rights doctrine used in other states. Instead, a water right is established by obtaining a permit from the state, specifically the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to divert a specific quantity of water for a specific beneficial use. The date the permit is granted establishes its priority. In times of water scarcity, such as a drought, permit holders with earlier priority dates, known as senior right holders, are entitled to receive their full, legally allocated amount of water. Only after all senior rights have been fully satisfied can permit holders with later priority dates, known as junior right holders, begin to use water. In the described scenario, the rancher established a beneficial use and secured a permit decades before the corporation. Therefore, the rancher holds the senior water right. The corporation’s newer permit makes it a junior right holder. Consequently, the corporation must cease or reduce its water diversion if it interferes with the rancher’s ability to access their full, senior-in-time water allocation. The concept of “beneficial use” is broad and includes domestic, agricultural, and industrial uses, but the priority is determined by time, not by the type or economic value of the use.

Astrid and Caspian hold title as tenants in common, each with an undivided one-half interest. The initial ownership by Astrid and Bjorn was a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which is characterized by the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession. A key feature of this form of ownership is the right of survivorship, meaning upon the death of one joint tenant, their interest automatically passes to the surviving joint tenant(s) outside of probate. However, a joint tenancy can be unilaterally severed by any of the joint tenants during their lifetime without the consent of the other co-owners. When a joint tenant conveys their interest to a third party, this action destroys the unities of time and title. In this scenario, when Bjorn executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest to Caspian, he broke the joint tenancy. The conveyance was a legally effective act that severed the survivorship aspect of the co-ownership. Consequently, the ownership structure was converted into a tenancy in common between Astrid and the new owner, Caspian. As tenants in common, there is no right of survivorship. Therefore, upon Bjorn’s subsequent death, his previously held interest did not pass to Astrid. Instead, the interest he had already legally transferred to Caspian remains with Caspian. The resulting ownership is that Astrid holds her original undivided one-half interest, and Caspian holds the undivided one-half interest he received from Bjorn, with both parties as tenants in common.

The core of this scenario lies in understanding the economic characteristics of real property and identifying the primary driver of value in a specific context. The land parcel near the planned hospital expansion and new highway interchange has significantly greater long-term value potential due to the economic characteristic of situs. Situs, often referred to as area preference, is the most significant economic factor influencing real estate value. It is not about the physical attributes of the land itself but rather its location and the preference people have for that location. The development of a major employment center like a hospital and improved transportation access via a new interchange dramatically increases the desirability of the surrounding area for residential, commercial, and ancillary medical services. This heightened desirability is a direct manifestation of situs. While other economic characteristics are at play, they are not the principal reason for the difference in value between the two parcels. For instance, permanence of investment describes the long-term, fixed nature of the improvements that will be made, but it applies to any development on either parcel and does not explain why one is a superior investment. Similarly, improvements are the physical additions that create value, but situs is the economic principle that explains the value derived from the property’s location relative to those external improvements. Scarcity is a fundamental concept for all land, but it does not account for the specific locational advantage one parcel holds over another. Therefore, the enhanced economic prospects and desirability stemming from the parcel’s location relative to community and infrastructure developments are best described by situs.

In South Dakota, a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is a form of co-ownership characterized by the four unities: time, title, interest, and possession. All joint tenants must acquire their interests at the same time, through the same title document, hold equal shares, and have an equal right to possess the entire property. The defining feature is the right of survivorship, meaning upon the death of one joint tenant, their interest automatically passes to the surviving joint tenants, bypassing probate. A crucial aspect of this ownership form is that a joint tenant has the right to unilaterally sever the joint tenancy with respect to their own interest. This can be done by selling or transferring their interest to a third party. When one of three or more joint tenants sells their interest, the act of conveyance severs the joint tenancy only for that specific share. The new owner cannot be a joint tenant with the remaining owners because the unities of time and title are broken; they acquired their interest at a different time and through a different document. Consequently, the new owner holds their share as a tenant in common with the remaining original owners. The original owners who did not sell their interests continue to hold their shares as joint tenants with right of survivorship between themselves.

South Dakota operates under a common law system for property ownership, not a community property system. In a community property state, most property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is considered to be owned equally by both. In contrast, South Dakota, as a common law state, generally recognizes that property is owned by the person who holds the title. However, this distinction becomes more nuanced in the context of divorce. For the division of assets upon divorce, South Dakota applies the legal doctrine of equitable distribution. Under the principle of equitable distribution, a court has the authority to divide all property owned by either or both spouses, regardless of how the property is titled or when it was acquired. The division is not automatically a 50/50 split; rather, the court aims for a division that is fair and just (equitable) based on the specific circumstances of the marriage. The court will consider numerous factors as outlined in state statutes, such as the duration of the marriage, the age and health of the spouses, their occupations and earning capacities, the value of the property, and the contribution of each spouse to the accumulation of the property. This includes recognizing the contributions of a spouse as a homemaker. Therefore, even if a property is titled in only one spouse’s name, if it was acquired during the marriage, it is considered part of the marital estate and is subject to this equitable division process. The origin of the funds from a community property state would be one of many facts considered, but the governing law for the division itself would be South Dakota’s equitable distribution standard.

The legal principle for interpreting conflicting elements in a property description follows a specific hierarchy of control. This hierarchy is based on the presumed intent of the parties at the time of the original conveyance and the reliability of the evidence. The highest priority is given to natural monuments, such as rivers or rock formations, because they are considered the most permanent and least likely to be mistaken. The next level of control is given to artificial monuments, which are man-made objects like iron pins, stakes, or concrete markers that were placed to mark a corner or boundary. Following monuments, the next priority is given to courses and distances, which are the directions and lengths of the boundary lines as stated in the deed. Lastly, stated area or quantity, such as “10 acres,” is considered the least reliable element. In the given scenario, there is a conflict between a stated distance and a called-for artificial monument. According to the established legal hierarchy, the physical, identifiable monument on the ground controls over the written distance in the legal description. The rationale is that the original surveyor’s primary action was to set the physical marker to define the corner; the measurement written in the description is secondary and more susceptible to human error in measurement or transcription. Therefore, the boundary line extends to the physical location of the identified iron pin, even if it contradicts the written distance.

According to South Dakota Codified Law 36-21A-136, a licensee must provide a copy of the South Dakota Real Estate Commission’s agency disclosure brochure to a prospective buyer or seller at the first substantive contact. The concept of first substantive contact is critical. It is defined as the point in a conversation where the licensee begins to elicit or accept confidential information from a consumer. This includes information about the consumer’s financial qualifications, negotiating strategies, or motivations. In the given scenario, the prospective buyer, Mateo, begins to divulge confidential information regarding his financial capacity and negotiating flexibility. This specific moment triggers the licensee’s legal duty. The licensee, Anya, must immediately cease the conversation about these topics and present Mateo with the written agency disclosure form. The purpose of this mandatory disclosure is to inform the consumer of the various agency relationships available and the duties owed by the licensee under each type before the consumer reveals any further information that could compromise their negotiating position. Anya currently represents the seller, and any information she receives from Mateo must be conveyed to her client. By providing the disclosure, Anya ensures Mateo understands this dynamic and can make an informed decision about how he wishes to be represented, or not represented, in the transaction.

Step 1: Identify the applicable statutory periods for adverse possession in South Dakota. The general period is 20 years under SDCL 15-3-1. However, a shorter 10-year period applies under SDCL 15-3-10 if the claimant has possession under “color of title” and has paid all legally assessed taxes on the land for ten consecutive years. Step 2: Analyze the facts of the scenario. The claimant, Silas, has been in possession of the parcel for 12 years. This is less than the general 20-year period but exceeds the special 10-year period. Step 3: Determine if the conditions for the shorter 10-year period are met. Silas possesses a recorded but faulty deed that includes the disputed parcel. This written instrument, which purports to convey title but is defective, constitutes “color of title.” The scenario also states that he has paid the property taxes as assessed based on this faulty deed for the entire 12-year duration. Step 4: Synthesize the facts with the law. Since Silas has maintained possession for more than 10 years, holds color of title to the parcel, and has paid the taxes for that period, he has satisfied all the requirements under SDCL 15-3-10. His use of the land for fencing, grazing, and maintaining a well establishes that the possession was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile (adverse to the true owner’s rights). Therefore, his claim for adverse possession is strong and likely to be successful. In South Dakota, the legal doctrine of adverse possession allows an individual to acquire title to another person’s real property without their consent. For this to occur, the claimant’s possession must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous for a statutorily defined period. The general statutory period in the state is twenty years. However, South Dakota law provides a significant exception that shortens this period considerably. If a person takes possession of a property under what is known as “color of title” and pays all legally assessed property taxes on that land for ten consecutive years, the required period of possession is reduced to only ten years. Color of title refers to a written document, such as a deed, that appears to be a legitimate claim to title but has some legal defect. In this case, the claimant’s possession for twelve years, coupled with a faulty deed that provides color of title and the continuous payment of taxes for that same period, meets the specific requirements of the shorter statutory path to ownership. The possession is considered hostile not because of ill will, but because it is inconsistent with the rights of the true owner.

The core legal principle governing this situation is the South Dakota Statute of Frauds, specifically SDCL 53-8-2. This statute mandates that certain types of contracts are invalid unless they are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. Crucially, this list includes any agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein. In the described scenario, while there appears to be a meeting of the minds between the parties through their verbal communication—including offer, acceptance, and an agreement on the price which serves as consideration—the agreement fails to meet a critical statutory requirement. The entire agreement is oral. For a contract for the sale of a home to be legally enforceable in South Dakota, it must be memorialized in a written document and signed. The verbal promise to send paperwork does not cure this defect. Without a signed, written contract, neither party can legally compel the other to perform. Therefore, a binding and enforceable contract has not been formed, and the seller is not legally obligated by the verbal discussion. The seller remains free to entertain and accept other offers until a written agreement is fully executed.

The legal owner of the property is Caleb. The controlling principle in this scenario is South Dakota’s recording statute, specifically SDCL 43-28-17. This statute establishes South Dakota as a “race-notice” jurisdiction. Under this rule, a subsequent purchaser of real property will have superior title over a prior purchaser if two conditions are met: first, the subsequent purchaser must be a “bona fide purchaser” (BFP), and second, they must record their deed before the prior purchaser records theirs. A bona fide purchaser is one who acquires the property for valuable consideration and without any actual or constructive notice of the prior, unrecorded interest. In this case, Beatrice was the first purchaser, but she failed to provide constructive notice to the public by not recording her deed. Caleb, the second purchaser, had no knowledge of the prior sale to Beatrice, making him a purchaser in good faith. He then won the “race” to the Register of Deeds office and recorded his deed first. Because Caleb was a good faith purchaser who recorded first, his claim to the title is legally superior to Beatrice’s, despite her transaction occurring earlier. The type of deed, whether warranty or quitclaim, is not the determining factor in this specific title priority dispute; the adherence to the race-notice recording law is what resolves the conflict.

The core legal principle at issue is discrimination based on familial status, which is a protected class under both the federal Fair Housing Act and the South Dakota Human Rights Act, codified in SDCL 20-13. A seller’s instruction to a real estate licensee to refuse to sell to families with children is an explicitly illegal instruction. A licensee’s duties to a client, such as the duty of obedience, do not extend to following unlawful orders. The licensee’s primary obligation is to uphold the law. Therefore, the first step is to educate the client, explaining that the request violates fair housing laws and cannot be fulfilled. The licensee must refuse to engage in any marketing or screening practices that would discriminate against potential buyers based on their familial status. If the client insists on pursuing this discriminatory course of action despite the warning, the licensee cannot be complicit. The only legally and ethically sound course of action at that point is to terminate the listing agreement. Continuing the relationship would mean participating in a discriminatory housing practice, exposing the licensee to severe legal and financial penalties, including license revocation and civil lawsuits. The duty to the law always supersedes a client’s illegal request.

The legally permissible action is Liam securing a loan by mortgaging his 60% interest. Under the principles governing tenancy in common in South Dakota, this form of co-ownership is defined by distinct, separate, and undivided interests in property. Each tenant in common holds a specific fractional interest, which can be equal or unequal, but they share a single unity: the right of possession of the entire parcel. A defining characteristic that distinguishes it from joint tenancy is the absence of the right of survivorship. Consequently, the interest of a tenant in common is freely inheritable. When a co-tenant dies, their interest passes to their heirs or devisees as specified in a will or by the laws of intestate succession, not to the surviving co-tenants. In this case, Omar’s 20% interest would legally transfer to his nephew, David. Furthermore, each tenant in common has the absolute right to alienate or encumber their individual interest without the consent of the other co-tenants. This means they can sell, gift, lease, or place a mortgage on their specific share. The new owner or lienholder then becomes a tenant in common with the remaining owners. Therefore, Liam’s action of using his 60% interest as collateral for a loan is a valid exercise of his ownership rights, as the mortgage lien attaches only to his share, not to the shares owned by Mei or David.

N/A The conveyance described creates a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. This is a type of defeasible freehold estate where the grantee’s ownership is contingent upon fulfilling a specific condition. The key language in the deed, “provided that” and “right to re-enter,” are classic indicators of this estate. Unlike a fee simple determinable, which terminates automatically upon the violation of its limitation (e.g., “so long as”), a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent does not end automatically. The grantor, or their heirs, retains a future interest known as a “right of re-entry” or “power of termination.” For the estate to be terminated, the holder of this right must take affirmative action, such as initiating a legal proceeding to reclaim the property, after the condition has been breached. The estate continues to be held by the grantee until this right is exercised. In this scenario, the heir, David, inherits this right of re-entry from his mother, Eleanor. The partial breach of the condition, by leasing a portion of the building, creates a situation where David may have grounds to exercise his right. However, the ownership does not revert to him automatically; he must pursue a legal remedy to enforce the forfeiture of the estate.

The legal basis for Anya’s ability to compel the sale of the specific parcel she contracted for rests on the physical characteristic of uniqueness, also known as non-homogeneity. This fundamental principle of real estate holds that no two parcels of land are ever exactly identical. Even if two properties are adjacent, of the same size, and appear similar, their precise geographic location is unique. In this scenario, the specific soil profile and aquifer access further enhance the distinctiveness of the contracted parcel. Because real property is unique, courts recognize that monetary damages are often an inadequate remedy for a buyer if a seller breaches the contract. The buyer cannot simply take the money and purchase an identical property elsewhere, because an identical property does not exist. Therefore, the legal remedy of specific performance is available, which allows a court to order the breaching party to perform their obligations under the contract, in this case, to convey the specific, unique parcel of land that was originally agreed upon. The other physical characteristics, while important to real estate in general, do not form the primary legal argument for enforcing a contract for one specific parcel over a proposed substitute. Immobility explains why the property’s location is fixed, and indestructibility refers to its permanence, but neither addresses why this particular piece of land cannot be substituted for another.

A counteroffer functions as a rejection of the original offer and the creation of a new offer. In this scenario, Leo’s initial offer was legally terminated the moment Anika presented her written counteroffer. The counteroffer is now a new offer from Anika to Leo, which Leo has the power to accept, thereby creating a binding contract. The deadline of 5:00 PM simply defines the period during which Leo holds this power of acceptance. It does not obligate Anika to keep the offer open for that entire duration. Anika, as the offeror of the new proposal (the counteroffer), retains the right to revoke her offer at any time before it has been accepted by Leo. The arrival of a more attractive offer from Priya does not automatically terminate or invalidate Anika’s outstanding counteroffer to Leo. For Anika to be legally free to accept Priya’s offer, she must first take the affirmative step of revoking her counteroffer to Leo. This revocation is only effective once it is communicated to and received by the offeree (Leo) or his designated agent. Therefore, Anika or her agent must communicate the withdrawal of the counteroffer to Leo or his agent before Leo communicates his acceptance.

The legal analysis hinges on the interpretation of the word “grant” in a conveyance under South Dakota law. According to South Dakota Codified Law (SDCL) 43-25-6, the use of the word “grant” in a conveyance implies specific, limited covenants, effectively creating what is known as a special warranty deed. These implied covenants are: (1) that the grantor has not previously conveyed the same estate to another person, and (2) that the estate is free from encumbrances “done, made, or suffered by the grantor.” The key phrase is “by the grantor.” In this scenario, the encumbrance in question is a mineral rights reservation that was established by a predecessor in title, long before Amara acquired the property. Since Amara, the grantor, did not create or cause this encumbrance during her period of ownership, she has not breached the limited warranties implied by the use of the word “grant.” Therefore, Mateo, the grantee, has no legal claim against Amara for this pre-existing defect in the title based on the deed provided. A general warranty deed, which would use language like “conveys and warrants,” offers the broadest protection, warranting against all defects in title, regardless of who created them. A quitclaim deed, conversely, offers no warranties whatsoever, simply transferring whatever interest the grantor may have. The deed Amara provided falls between these two extremes. It is a valid conveyance, but the protection it offers the grantee is limited to title issues that arose during the grantor’s ownership. The pre-existing mineral rights reservation is an encumbrance that originated before Amara’s ownership. Consequently, while it is a valid cloud on the title, it does not constitute a breach of the special warranty provided by Amara. Mateo’s recourse would have been to insist on a general warranty deed or to discover the encumbrance during a thorough title search before closing the transaction. The lawsuit against Amara for breach of covenant is therefore unlikely to succeed.

An estate at will is a type of leasehold estate that does not have a specific term of duration. The tenancy continues as long as both the landlord and the tenant mutually agree. It can be created through an express agreement or by implication. In South Dakota, the termination of an estate at will is governed by specific legal principles. While it can be terminated by either party providing proper notice, which under state law requires a written notice of at least one month, it can also be terminated automatically by operation of law. Certain events will extinguish the tenancy immediately without the need for notice. These events include the death of either the landlord or the tenant, or the landlord’s conveyance of the property to a new owner. When the landlord sells the property, the estate at will is automatically terminated. The new owner is not bound by the previous informal arrangement, and the tenant’s right to occupy the premises ceases at the moment of the sale. The tenant does not have a legal right to remain on the property and is not entitled to a statutory notice period from the new owner because the tenancy itself no longer exists. This automatic termination is a defining characteristic of an estate at will, distinguishing it from other leaseholds like a periodic tenancy, which would typically continue and become the responsibility of the new owner.

There are no calculations required for this question. A life estate is a freehold estate where an individual, known as the life tenant, holds an interest in real property for the duration of their own life or the life of another person. The person who will inherit the property upon the termination of the life estate is called the remainderman. The life tenant has specific rights and responsibilities. They have the right to possess, use, and derive income from the property, but they also have a fundamental duty to maintain the property and not commit waste. Waste is any act or omission that diminishes the value of the property for the remainderman. There are different types of waste, including voluntary waste (active destruction), permissive waste (neglect), and ameliorative waste (alterations that may increase the property’s value but fundamentally change its character). In this scenario, the life tenant proposes to demolish an existing structure and build a new one. Even if the new structure is more modern or potentially more valuable, this action constitutes a fundamental alteration of the estate that the remainderman is entitled to receive. The life tenant’s duty is to preserve the property in substantially the same condition as it was when the life estate began, subject to normal wear and tear. Therefore, the remainderman has a legal right to prevent the life tenant from making such significant changes. The remainderman’s interest is in receiving the specific property as intended by the grantor, not a different or “improved” version. They can seek an injunction to stop the proposed demolition and construction to protect their future interest in the property.

The logical deduction proceeds as follows: 1. Identify the core source of the land’s enhanced value. The parcel’s value is not derived from features on the land itself (it is undeveloped), but from its strategic position relative to external economic drivers: the new business park and the proposed city bypass. 2. Evaluate the four economic characteristics of real estate in the context of this scenario. 3. Scarcity refers to the finite supply of land. While the land in this specific desirable location is now scarce, scarcity itself does not explain *why* it is desirable. 4. Improvements refer to man-made additions to the land that increase its value. The value in question is not from improvements on the parcel itself, but from improvements on surrounding land. 5. Permanence of investment refers to the long-term nature and capital intensity of infrastructure and buildings. The business park is a permanent investment, but this characteristic describes the investment itself, not the effect of its location on other properties. 6. Situs, or area preference, refers to the value derived from a property’s specific location and the desirability of that location due to factors like proximity to employment, transportation, and amenities. The parcel’s high value is a direct result of its proximity to the new business park and bypass. Therefore, situs is the primary economic characteristic at play. Real estate possesses several distinct economic characteristics that determine its value. One of the most significant is situs, often referred to as area preference or location. This concept recognizes that the value of a parcel of land is heavily influenced by its position relative to other objects and economic activities. It is the preference people have for certain locations. In this case, the undeveloped parcel’s value is not intrinsic to the land itself but is created by its strategic proximity to a major new employment center and a future major transportation route. These external factors make its location highly desirable for future development, directly increasing its market value. While other characteristics are related, they are not the primary driver. For instance, the business park and bypass are considered improvements, and their development represents a permanence of investment. However, the specific characteristic that describes the value added to the adjacent parcel *because* of its location next to these improvements is situs. Scarcity is also a factor, as land in this now-prime location is limited, but this scarcity is a consequence of the high demand created by the desirable situs.

The core of this scenario rests on understanding the scope and limitations of a general agency relationship, specifically in the context of property management. Anya acts as a general agent for Lin, the property owner. A general agent is authorized to perform a broad range of acts related to a particular business or activity on a continuous basis. For a property manager, this includes collecting rent, marketing units, and handling routine maintenance. However, this authority is not unlimited. The property management agreement explicitly limits her unilateral spending to $500. A $15,000 roof replacement is a major capital expenditure, far exceeding both the specified limit and the generally accepted scope of routine maintenance. Therefore, Anya does not have the authority to unilaterally enter into a contract for the full replacement. Her fiduciary duties to the principal (Lin) require her to act in Lin’s best interest. This includes taking immediate, reasonable steps to mitigate further damage, which is an implied authority to protect the asset. Placing emergency tarps on the roof falls under this category. Concurrently, her duty of disclosure and obedience requires her to inform Lin of this material fact (the extensive damage) and present viable solutions, such as contractor bids, so that Lin, the principal, can make the ultimate decision on the major expenditure. Proceeding with the full repair without authorization would be a breach of her agency duties.

The correct outcome is that the easement remains valid and is now held by Global Power Inc. The type of easement described is a commercial easement in gross. An easement in gross grants a right to a specific person or entity to use the land of another, known as the servient estate, without the easement holder owning any adjoining land. In this case, Prairie Wind Energy is the holder, and Anja’s ranch is the servient estate. A critical distinction in South Dakota, as in most jurisdictions, is between commercial and personal easements in gross. Commercial easements, such as those for utilities, pipelines, or wind turbines, are created for a business purpose and are considered an asset of the business. As such, they are freely assignable, transferable, and inheritable, meaning they can be sold or conveyed to another entity. The acquisition of Prairie Wind Energy by Global Power Inc. would include the transfer of all its assets, including this easement right. Furthermore, an easement is an encumbrance on the title of the servient estate. When Anja sold her ranch to Mateo, the property was transferred subject to all existing, recorded encumbrances. Because the easement was properly recorded, Mateo, the new owner, is legally bound to honor it. The sale of the servient land does not extinguish a valid, recorded easement. Therefore, the easement runs with the land and binds Mateo, and the right to use the easement was validly transferred from Prairie Wind Energy to its successor, Global Power Inc.

The Sioux Falls home would be classified as marital property subject to equitable division. The legal principle at play involves the characterization of assets when a couple moves from a community property state to a common law (equitable distribution) state like South Dakota. South Dakota law dictates that upon divorce, marital property should be divided equitably, which means fairly, but not necessarily in a strict 50/50 split. The key factor is the source of the funds used to purchase the asset. In this scenario, the home in Sioux Falls was purchased using the proceeds from the sale of a home in Arizona. The Arizona home, having been acquired during the marriage while residing in a community property state, was legally considered community property, owned equally by both spouses. Courts in equitable distribution states like South Dakota will often apply a concept known as tracing. This means they trace the origin of the funds used to acquire new assets. Because the funds for the South Dakota home came directly from a community property asset, the new home retains the character of marital property, regardless of how it is titled. Titling the property in only one spouse’s name does not automatically convert it to separate property when the acquisition funds were marital. Therefore, the court has the authority and is likely to include the full value of the Sioux Falls home in the marital estate to be divided equitably between the spouses.

The analysis of this situation requires applying two separate South Dakota statutory time limits. First, for the potential easement, South Dakota law (SDCL 15-3-1) establishes a 20-year period for acquiring an easement by prescription. The use must be open, continuous, and adverse (without the owner’s permission). Chen’s use of the path for 22 years meets these criteria, as it exceeds the 20-year requirement and was done without Anya’s consent. Therefore, a valid prescriptive easement has been established, which is a non-monetary encumbrance that runs with the land and would bind a new owner. Second, for the contractor’s claim, South Dakota law (SDCL 44-9-5) dictates that a mechanic’s lien must be filed within 120 days after the final day of work or material delivery. The work was completed on March 1st. Counting the days: 30 in March (after the 1st), 30 in April, 31 in May, and 29 in June totals 120 days. The deadline for filing was approximately June 29th. Dakota Builders filed the lien on July 15th, which is beyond the 120-day statutory period. Consequently, the mechanic’s lien is invalid and unenforceable because it was not perfected in a timely manner. The correct assessment is that the property is burdened by the easement but not by the lien.

Bjorn’s one-third interest passes to his designated heir, Leif, through his will. In South Dakota, the law establishes a default form of co-ownership when a property is conveyed to two or more unmarried individuals. This default is tenancy in common. According to South Dakota Codified Law (SDCL) 43-2-12, an interest in property in favor of multiple persons is an interest in common, unless the instrument of transfer expressly declares the interest to be a joint tenancy. For a joint tenancy with right of survivorship to be created, the deed must contain specific, unambiguous language, such as “to Astrid, Bjorn, and Ingrid as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.” The deed in this scenario simply granted the property “to Astrid, Bjorn, and Ingrid,” which lacks the express declaration required to overcome the legal presumption of a tenancy in common. The defining characteristic of a tenancy in common is that there is no right of survivorship. Each co-owner holds a separate, undivided fractional interest in the property, which they can sell, devise, or inherit independently. When a tenant in common dies, their interest does not automatically transfer to the surviving co-owners. Instead, it becomes part of their estate and is distributed according to their will or, if they die intestate, through the state’s laws of succession. Therefore, when Bjorn passed away, his one-third interest was a devisable asset that passed to his named heir, Leif, as stipulated in his valid will. Astrid and Ingrid remain tenants in common, but now their co-owner is Leif, who holds Bjorn’s former one-third share.

Step 1: Identify the core property right in question. The central issue is Aris’s right of exclusion, which is a fundamental component of the bundle of rights associated with fee simple ownership. Step 2: Analyze the nature of Aris’s ownership of the creek. Under South Dakota law, for a non-navigable stream, a riparian landowner’s property extends to the center thread of the watercourse. This establishes Aris’s ownership of the land beneath the water on his side of the property line. Step 3: Evaluate the local ordinance. The ordinance states that access is for recreational fishing “with landowner permission.” This is a critical clause. It does not create a public right of access that overrides private property rights. Instead, it is an exercise of police power that acknowledges and upholds the owner’s right to grant or deny permission. Therefore, the ordinance does not diminish Aris’s right to exclude Lena. Step 4: Evaluate the neighbor’s claim of historical precedent. For a historical use to become a legally enforceable right, it must meet the stringent requirements for a prescriptive easement in South Dakota, which includes use that is open, notorious, continuous, and adverse for a statutory period of 20 years. The scenario does not provide facts to support the establishment of such an easement, making Lena’s claim legally unsubstantiated. Step 5: Evaluate the utility easement. An easement grants a specific right for a specific purpose to a specific party (the utility). It does not grant general recreational rights to the public or to neighbors. The utility’s right to access the creek bed for maintenance does not transfer any access rights to Lena and does not convert the easement area into a public thoroughfare. Step 6: Synthesize the findings. Aris’s fee simple ownership, including his riparian rights, grants him the right of exclusion. This right is not overridden by the local ordinance (which requires his consent), is not defeated by an unsubstantiated claim of historical use, and is not affected by the specific, limited purpose of the utility easement. Thus, Aris retains the legal authority to prevent Lena from fishing on his property. The bundle of rights is a foundational concept in real estate, representing the legal rights of ownership of real property. These rights include possession, control, enjoyment, exclusion, and disposition. However, these rights are not absolute and can be limited by both public and private restrictions. Public limitations include police power, eminent domain, taxation, and escheat. In this scenario, the local ordinance is an example of police power, which is the government’s right to regulate for the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. Critically, this ordinance defers to the landowner’s authority by including the “with landowner permission” clause, meaning it does not strip the owner of their right to exclude. Private limitations can include deed restrictions, liens, and easements. The utility easement is a private limitation, but its scope is strictly defined. It burdens the property for the utility’s benefit only and does not create a general right of access for others. Finally, claims like a prescriptive easement can also limit an owner’s rights, but they require a high burden of proof over a long period, which is not met here. A thorough understanding requires analyzing how these various limitations interact with the fundamental rights of the property owner.

The attempted conveyance of the property is invalid. The property remains part of Ansel’s estate at the time of his death and is subject to the claims of creditors. The core legal principle at issue is the requirement of delivery for a deed to be effective. In South Dakota, for voluntary alienation by deed to occur, there must be a valid delivery of the deed from the grantor to the grantee during the grantor’s lifetime. Delivery is more than the physical act of handing over the paper; it requires the grantor’s present intent to immediately and irrevocably pass title to the grantee. The grantor must relinquish all control and dominion over the instrument. In this scenario, Ansel’s actions clearly indicate an intent for the transfer to take effect only upon his death, not at the time he signed the deed. By placing the deed in a safe deposit box with instructions for delivery after his death, he retained the ability to reclaim and destroy the deed at any point during his life. This means he did not relinquish control, and therefore, legal delivery did not occur. An attempted transfer of property that is intended to take effect only upon the grantor’s death is considered a testamentary disposition. To be legally effective, a testamentary disposition must comply with the strict statutory formalities of a will, which typically includes signing in the presence of two witnesses. A standard deed, even if notarized, does not meet the requirements of a will. Consequently, because there was no valid lifetime delivery, the deed failed to convey title to Brielle, and the ranch remains an asset of Ansel’s estate.